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Detecting policy violations through trafﬁc analysis
Jeffrey Horton and Rei Safavi-Naini
Centre for Information Security
University of Wollongong
Northﬁelds Avenue, Wollongong, Australia
{jeffh,rei}@uow.edu.au
Abstract
Restrictions are commonly placed on the permitted uses
of network protocols in the interests of security. These restrictions can sometimes be difﬁcult to enforce. As an example, a permitted protocol can be used as a carrier for
another protocol not otherwise permitted. However, if the
observable behaviour of the protocol exhibits differences
between permitted and non-permitted uses, it is possible to
detect inappropriate use.
We consider SSH, the Secure Shell protocol. This is an
encrypted protocol with several uses. We attempt ﬁrstly to
classify SSH sessions according to some different types of
trafﬁc for which the sessions have been used, and secondly,
given a policy that permits SSH use for interactive trafﬁc, to
identify when a session appears to have been used for some
other purpose.

1

Introduction

Many modern organisations provide employees with access to the Internet and other networks to enable them to
perform their jobs. However, it is important to ensure that
this access is being used appropriately and in compliance
with organisational policy. For example, policies can be
stated in terms of restrictions on Web access or the types
of protocols that employees can use.
However, permitted protocols can have uses which are undesirable, and
it can be difﬁcult to prevent or even detect instances of inappropriate use with current network security tools such as
ﬁrewalls and intrusion detection systems. Controlling the
use of encrypted network protocols is also problematic.
Modern ﬁrewalls can be very good at blocking network
trafﬁc based on low-level criteria such as source address and
destination port, and can be very useful in protecting networks of machines from inappropriate or unnecessary outside access. However, ﬁrewalls that perform only this sort
of simple stateful inspection cannot check that the trafﬁc

being passed conforms to the speciﬁcation of the desired
protocol. Firewalls providing some form of “deep inspection” [25] are capable of detecting a limited set of known attacks and protocol anomalies in certain common protocols.
Proxies (such as are found in proxy ﬁrewalls) can check
conformance to protocol speciﬁcations to a greater extent
than deep inspection stateful packet ﬁltering ﬁrewalls. No
type of ﬁrewall provides the higher-level protocol understanding that can enable the detection of malicious usage
of the protocol — a conversation which complies with the
speciﬁcations, does not attempt to exploit a vulnerability
such as a buffer overﬂow vulnerability but which does not
otherwise closely resemble “normal” trafﬁc. Tools such as
httptunnel [4] exist to facilitate tunneling arbitrary network trafﬁc through an HTTP proxy, for example.
Neither ﬁrewalls nor proxies handle encrypted trafﬁc
well, having no access to the data protected by encryption.
Encrypted data cannot easily be scanned for malicious contents such as viruses or spyware until it reaches the end
system and is decrypted. Outgoing encrypted data cannot
easily be scanned for content such as proprietary corporate
information being inappropriately released. It is difﬁcult to
ensure even that the underlying protocol being used is appropriate. For example, SSL may be permitted in order to
allow secure access to websites, with an expectation that
the protocol being protected is HTTP. However, SSL may
be used in conjunction with other protocols, and it may be
difﬁcult to distinguish desired uses from unwanted and inappropriate ones.
In some cases, it is not reasonable to block all encrypted
protocols — SSL is required for secure website access, and
SSH (Secure Shell protocol) may be required by some users
for remote access to computing resources, for example.
In this paper we will be looking at the identiﬁcation of
different types of uses of SSH using only the information
that is available for inspection after the data has been encrypted: the packet size and inter-arrival time. We assume
that the primary desirable use of SSH is the provision of
secure remote terminal access. Implementations of the pro-
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tocol commonly have many additional features with substantial potentially legitimate uses. However, these features
can also enable users to bypass organisational security policies (for example, port forwarding features can be used to
browse inappropriate Web sites during the working day, if
the site terminating the SSH tunnel has a more permissive
general Internet access policy than the client site) and in
some environments it may be considered appropriate to attempt to detect such activity. Our intention is to be able to
provide assistance in auditing compliance with relevant organisational policies. We are not just looking at tunneled
trafﬁc: we are also interested in identifying usage of features such as X11 forwarding, use of which may be discouraged due to security concerns.
We have some success classifying SSH sessions according to the type of trafﬁc being carried in the session; for
the main classes of trafﬁc being examined we can assign
the trafﬁc to classes with low false positive and false negative rates but with signiﬁcant “don’t know” rates, where a
connection is not assigned to an appropriate class. However, the classiﬁcation process does not perform as well for
some of the minor classes of trafﬁc studied, for which we
did not collect many samples. We are more successful at
differentiating interactive trafﬁc from other types of trafﬁc,
with false positive and false negative rates of around 3%. In
the absence of an active attacker, we believe it is possible to
identify types of activity other than simple interactive use
of SSH with a high degree of conﬁdence.
In Section 2 we look at related work, Section 3 provides
a brief overview of some of the relevant capabilities of SSH
implementations, in particular the OpenSSH [22] implementation of the protocol. Section 4 discusses our analysis
of SSH trafﬁc. In Section 5 we discuss experiments, data
processing and results. We discuss ways in which detection could be evaded in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in
Section 7.

2

Related Work

Trafﬁc classiﬁcation has emerged as an important area,
now that the port over which trafﬁc ﬂows is no longer sufﬁcient to determine what the actual protocol of the trafﬁc
is. This has been identiﬁed as a problem in the identiﬁcation of peer-to-peer trafﬁc by Karagiannis et al. [17], who
develop a method of identifying P2P activity based on the
patterns of interconnection between network peers. Nonpayload based methods of trafﬁc classiﬁcation can be of
particular interest, owing to privacy concerns that can arise
over access to the full trafﬁc payload.
Work in the area of trafﬁc classiﬁcation has used a variety of machine learning techniques, including decision
trees [8] and hidden Markov models [31, 32]. Wright et
al. [31, 32] consider a general trafﬁc classiﬁcation problem,

for which SSH is one type of trafﬁc being classiﬁed. Some
interesting results are reported, but they do not look at attempting to identify different types of tunneled SSH trafﬁc,
or detection of the use of SSH features such as X11 forwarding.
Song et al. [28] have reported on an attack against SSH
that uses keystroke timings as reﬂected in SSH packet interarrival times to substantially reduce the amount of work that
needs to be done when cracking passwords.
We are not aware of other work that addresses the use of
SSH speciﬁcally.
Tunneling has been proposed and implemented over
many different protocols, including ICMP [6], Domain Name System (DNS) request and replies [16] and
HTTP. An example of an HTTP tunneling package is
httptunnel [4].
Measures to detect and ﬁlter tunneling through ICMP
have been proposed [27, 26]. We are not aware of any work
having been done on the detection of tunneling using DNS
messages. Some work has been done on detecting tunneling using HTTP requests and responses. Pack et al. [24, 23]
describe their work on detecting HTTP tunneling using behaviour proﬁles consisting of features such as the number
of packets, the ratio of large and small packets and the total
amount of data received. Unfortunately, it is difﬁcult to say
how effective this system is as there is no way presented to
determine what attacks might be missed.
Mudge [19] has proposed detecting tunneling by determining what “normal” HTTP trafﬁc looks like, and generating some simple measures, such as length of session or
amount of data transferred, to use in detecting abnormal sessions. This paper does not discuss an implementation of a
system to detect misuse of HTTP. Borders and Prakash [3]
describe the results obtained from implementing a system
to detect intruder reverse tunnels and communications back
to home base of adware and spyware using a range of measures taken from “normal” HTTP trafﬁc. Rather than focusing on packet level statistics, measures included header
formatting, inter-request arrival time, request regularity and
request size, among others. These are higher-level measurements than those used by Pack et al. The system was
successful at detecting tunneling activity, including the activity of a tunneling program custom-designed by the authors. Bissias et al. [2] have had some success identifying
the source of SSL-protected HTTP trafﬁc using proﬁles of
statistical characteristics of Web requests to sites of interest.
Covert channels have been extensively reported as an undesired feature of multi-level security operating system implementations that can be used to violate the security policy of these systems by enabling information to pass from
a high security level to a lower one. [21, 1]. Guidelines required the minimisation of the bandwidth available through
these channels [21].
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• Dynamic port forwarding causes SSH to behave as a
SOCKS4 or SOCKS5 proxy. Connections to a speciﬁed local port are tunneled through the SSH connection to an arbitrary (dynamic) destination host and
port. Many applications have built-in SOCKS support,
which makes this technique very powerful. It works
very well for performing Web browsing, which is the
common use for this type of forwarding in the experiments performed in this paper.

Covert channels exist in modern network protocols as
well [12]. For example, a method of embedding information
using the TCP timestamp option has been proposed [11].
Murdoch and Lewis [20] review many of the proposals for
embedding covert channels into TCP and IP, and propose a
method of embedding data into TCP sequence numbers and
IP identiﬁcation ﬁelds that respects the statistical properties
of these ﬁelds as generated by Linux and OpenBSD. Lucena
et al. [18] examine IPv6 for opportunities for embedding
covert channels. “Active wardens” have been proposed and
to some extent implemented to clean network protocols of
covert channels [9]. Firewall proxies can be helpful at removing covert channels from low-level network protocols,
as these systems typically do not pass IP packets or TCP
segments directly from one side of the ﬁrewall to the other.

3

SSH Capabilities

SSH is used by many as a secure replacement for remote
access methods such as telnet and rlogin. Unlike
these protocols, SSH provides facilities to validate the identity of the remote host in order to reduce the possibility of
a man-in-the-middle attack, and encrypts and authenticates
all SSH trafﬁc during the session, protecting against network snooping attacks. In contrast, telnet and rlogin
are plaintext protocols that have no security features beyond
verifying a user password. However, implementations of
SSH commonly have many additional features whose use is
not appropriate in all environments. In this paper, we work
with OpenSSH [22], principally late releases of version 3.
• X11 forwarding. When accessing a remote host,
OpenSSH has the ability to tunnel the X11 protocol
messages through the SSH connection, protecting the
X11 trafﬁc from inspection by an attacker. Unfortunately, if the administrators of the remote machine are
not fully trusted, or it has been compromised, X11 forwarding may1 allow anyone with access to the user’s
.Xauthority ﬁle to access other X windows open
on the user’s desktop. As an example, xkey [10] allows an attacker on the remote machine to snoop on
key presses made in other windows on the user’s desktop which are not related to the SSH session [13].
• File transfer, using either scp or sftp. This can be
used to export corporate information, or to import arbitrary data, including malicious software which then
can only be detected by antivirus software running on
the user’s machine.
1 In recent versions of OpenSSH, this may require “trusted X11” forwarding to be enabled. Some X11 clients do not work properly without
trusted X11 forwarding enabled, so it seems likely that trusted X11 forwarding could be expected to be enabled if X11 forwarding is enabled at
all.

• Static local port forwarding allows connections to local ports to be tunneled through the SSH connection to
a designated remote host and port. It is very similar to
dynamic port forwarding, except that the ﬁnal destination for the forwarded trafﬁc is ﬁxed. Some protocols
cannot be used effectively with static port forwarding.
Other relevant capabilities which we have not investigated in detail include remote static port forwarding and
(new in version 4) support for establishing full VPNs using
an SSH tunnel.
OpenSSH also provides the ability to compress data before forwarding it through the tunnel, which can be very
useful for reducing the amount of network trafﬁc required,
particularly for slow networks. It does mean that it is necessary to consider both compressed and uncompressed forms
of different types of trafﬁc when attempting to build a useful
classiﬁcation system.
ACSI 33 [7], an information security policy guide published by Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate, includes
guidance on the recommended conﬁguration of SSH for
Australian government agencies. In particular, it is recommended to disable connection forwarding and X11 forwarding. However, not all servers located at other organisations
with different security policies to which a user might connect will necessarily have these features disabled, and enforcing the restrictions from the client side of the connection may be impractical.
We identify SSH’s interactive capabilities as its primary
desirable feature. We aim to detect non-interactive use and
possibly even identify use of X11 forwarding, ﬁle transfer
and different types of port forwarding, so that some form of
limited audit capability could be implemented for compliance with high-level policies on the use of SSH.

4

Analysis of SSH trafﬁc

Our analysis of SSH trafﬁc is based on collecting statistical distributions for SSH trafﬁc in which particular types of
activity are conducted, and using these distributions to classify unknown connections using an instance-based learning approach. Our hypothesis is that data such as packet
sizes will reveal information about the activity that is being
conducted during the SSH session. We represent an SSH
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connection with a probability distribution (normalised frequency of packet sizes) and use multiple samples of a particular type of trafﬁc (for example, ﬁle transfer) to deﬁne a
class of connections.
A “connection” can be described by a 4-tuple consisting
of source and destination IP and source and destination port.
We do not use timeouts to separate connections with the
same 4-tuple from each other, because the protocol which
we are studying uses TCP for data transport. A TCP connection can be left idle without timing out, and use can then
be resumed without difﬁculty. The packets that are used to
initiate a TCP connection have the TCP SYN ﬂag set; we
use packets with the SYN ﬂag set and corresponding to the
same 4-tuple to separate connections from each other.
The size of packets in the SSH connection provides only
a general indication of the amount of actual application data
being carried. This is because of the cryptographic protection mechanisms: block ciphers process data in chunks of
a particular size (AES, for example, has a block size of
16 bytes), and integrity protection can result in message
authentication codes of 10 bytes or more being attached.
Small amounts of extra padding can also be added. A single keypress in an interactive SSH session can result in an
SSH packet of around 50 bytes. In some cases, compression prior to encryption will remove redundancy from the
plaintext and result in smaller packets observed than would
otherwise be the case.
We divide a connection into two halves, the part of the
connection in which data ﬂows from client to server, and
the part in which data ﬂows from server to client. Statistics
are computed separately for each.
We evaluate how well the classiﬁcation process works
using cross-validation [30] and confusion matrices. Crossvalidation is a standard technique for evaluating machine
learning algorithms. In this case, we use 10-fold crossvalidation. We implement cross-validation by randomly
partitioning the data set into 10 partitions. One partition
is used as test data, the other nine as training data for classifying the test samples. Each partition is used as test data in
turn, and the results of the classiﬁcation are used to form a
confusion matrix. The rows of the confusion matrix represents the actual class of an item, and the columns the classes
to which the classiﬁcation algorithm assigns the item. Confusion matrices show how readily different classes of items
are distinguished from each other by the classiﬁcation algorithm. Small variations are possible in the results of crossvalidation due to different random partitions of the data set.

4.1

Algorithm description

The classiﬁcation algorithm can be described as follows:
• Load connection packet size probability distributions

and other statistics for connections of known classiﬁcation.
• Generate statistics for connection of unknown classiﬁcation.
• Measure the “distance” between the statistics of the
unknown connection and each known connection.
• Sort the scores in order of closeness.
• The unknown connection is assigned to the same class
as the majority verdict (3 or more) of the closest ﬁve
connections.

4.2

Frequency distributions

The maximum size of packets will vary depending on
the physical network medium used to transmit the packets. Our experiments were conducted on Ethernet networks,
and for this medium the largest packet size is 1500 bytes.
This quantity is otherwise known as the Maximum Transfer
Unit (MTU). However, we use only the amount of user data
present in each TCP segment for generating the frequency
distributions. We do not count the IP or TCP headers. The
amount of user data that is present in packets is further constrained by the TCP Maximum Segment Size (MSS) for
each part of the connection. The network MTU affects the
MSS setting, but it is also affected by the presence of ﬁrewall equipment in the network, which can adjust the MSS
of connections. We chose a maximum for our packet size
range of 1300 bytes; larger packets would be assigned to the
same bin as a packet of 1300 bytes.
We did not count packets with no user data, such as TCP
acknowledgment-only packets.
We assigned each data point to one of 30 bins. Too few
bins do not bring out the features of each distribution sufﬁciently. Too many bins will be oversensitive to minor variations in the trafﬁc. 30 bins was considered to approximate
a distribution with a bin size of 1 (the extreme) reasonably
well. The bins were of integral size; leftovers were distributed evenly across the bins, so that all bins are very similar in size.
After computing the packet size frequencies, the distribution was normalised to form a probability distribution
which could be used with some selected distance measures.

4.3

Distance measures

There are many distance measures which can be used
to compare the closeness of two probability distributions,
including the variational distance, harmonic mean and
Kullback-Liebler divergence. We used the Jensen-Shannon
divergence [5] (a form of the Kullback-Liebler divergence)
and the Bhattacharyya distance [15].
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The Bhattacharyya distance was calculated using2 :

√
pi q i
B(P, Q) = 1 −

• Packets per second for packets with an inter-arrival
time of less than 2 seconds. This statistic is computed
in the same manner as that of bytes per second.

(1)

• Bytes per packet.

i
3

The Jensen-Shannon divergence was calculated using:
DJS (P Q) =

1
(pi lg
2 i

pi
pi +qi
2

+ qi lg

qi
pi +qi
2

)

(2)

In both equations P and Q represent the two probability
distributions being compared. P might represent a distribution of known classiﬁcation, Q a distribution of unknown
classiﬁcation. However, as these measures are symmetric,
which is known and which is unknown is not important.
Both measures are easily calculated, the Bhattacharyya
distance being somewhat simpler to compute than the
Jensen-Shannon divergence. Results closer to zero indicate
better matches for each measure. The Bhattacharyya distance has been used with machine learning approaches [5]
and has been used with success for signal selection [15],
for example. The Jensen-Shannon measure is symmetric,
unlike the Kullback-Liebler divergence itself, and was chosen as a representative of the divergence-type measures that
were described as a form of the Kullback-Liebler divergence.
Since we separate a single connection into client- and
server-sourced parts, we will have two distance measure
calculations, one for each distribution, forming a score vector. The ﬁnal score for any two distributions being compared is the magnitude of the score vector. This allows additional measures to be easily used if desired.

4.4

Additional statistics

In addition to the probability distribution distance measures we can compute, there are many other possible statistics that may be used to shed some light on the type of activity occurring during an SSH session. We compute the
following additional statistics:
• Bytes per second for packets with an inter-arrival time
of less than 2 seconds. This statistic captures information on the amount of data transferred during the times
when the connection is active, so periods of time when
the connection is idle do not inﬂuence the generation
of the statistic. The statistic is computed by totaling
the packet sizes and dividing by the sum of the interarrival times, for packets with inter-arrival times less
than 2 seconds.
 √
2

An alternative form could be B(P, Q) = − ln i pi qi .
that we used logarithms to the base 2 in calculating the JensenShannon divergence.
3 Note

• We deﬁne a “chain” as a sequence of packets of the
same size at least 5 packets in length, and use this to
calculate two statistics:
– The packet size whose chains account for the
largest number of packets in the connection.
– The packet size that accounts for the largest number of chains.
The idea behind these statistics is that an interactive
connection will consist of a large number of packets of
a very similar size.
Typically when using these statistics for classiﬁcation
the logarithm of the value rather than the value itself will be
used. Bytes per second, for example, exhibits a wide range
of values. Using a logarithm of the value reduces the range
of variation and minimizes the effect that a statistic has on
the other statistics being used in the classiﬁcation so that the
effect is not overwhelming. In the case of bytes per second
we also impose a threshold on the value of four kilobytes
per second — anything larger is treated as 4kB/second. This
is sufﬁcient for the main types of behaviour we seek to identify.

5

Experiments

5.1

Data Collection

The data collected constitutes full header and partial payload information on a subset of the principal author’s SSH
sessions from late 2005 to May, 2006. This constitutes over
400 sessions and 11.5 million packets. All except some ﬁle
transfer sessions (which appears not to be truly interactive,
not even when using sftp) were operated manually. Network trafﬁc was captured using tcpdump, running on either the source or sink of the trafﬁc. Care was taken that
packets were not double-counted. Capturing trafﬁc at a
point intermediate to the SSH client and server would have
been preferred, but this option was not available for these
experiments.
Most of the trafﬁc captured comprised interactive, X11,
ﬁle transfer and Web browsing sessions tunneled through
an SSH connection. Small amounts of USENET news trafﬁc (NNTP) and Samba SMB/CIFS ﬁle sharing trafﬁc were
captured4 . Finally, a number of graphical sessions using
4 Tunneling Samba trafﬁc through SSH required the aid of a transparent
SOCKS proxy redirector and local ﬁrewall support to redirect the trafﬁc to
the proxy.
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NoMachine’s NX X11 compression technology were captured between a NoMachine NX client and a FreeNX server.
We provide further information on the main categories of
monitored sessions:
• Interactive sessions consisted of a variety of activities, including mail reading and editing, programming, system administration tasks and other command
shell work. In many sessions extensive use was made
of screen, a terminal multiplexer that allows many
command line shells to be executed simultaneously
within a single login session. The size of the window
will affect the size of response packets from the server
where screen refreshes are required, so windows of a
variety of sizes were used.
• X11 applications used in these sessions included
xterm, synaptic, Acrobat Reader, OpenOfﬁce,
xdvi and ImageMagick.
• Web browsing included access to daily news sites, corporate sites, sites with programming and development
information and a variety of other sites of personal
and professional interest to the principal author. Only
small ﬁles such as PDFs or certain source code packages were downloaded during these monitored Web
browsing sessions. Web browsing used Mozilla, Safari and Firefox.
• File transfer was principally composed of small ﬁles
(on the order of several megabytes in size) or groups
of such ﬁles. File transfers were performed in both
directions; that is, ﬁles were transferred both to and
from the ﬁle transfer client.
It should be noted that as far as possible, sessions were
“pure”: a session used for HTTP tunneling would be used
only for HTTP tunneling, not interactive trafﬁc as well (it
would be possible in practice to do both, however).
NX was of interest because it is claimed that this technology can make X11 sessions useful even over network
links with very restricted bandwidth capabilities, and it was
thought that for some types of activities such a session
might more closely resemble an interactive session than
other types of graphical session. In Section 3, we identiﬁed
security concerns with the use of X11 forwarding through
SSH. In some brief experiments with NX X11 sessions, we
were unsuccessful in using the X11 xkey exploit previously
discussed to snoop on other X windows unrelated to the NX
session; it only appeared to allow snooping on other X windows open in the NX session, a much less signiﬁcant problem than for ordinary X11 forwarding but still possibly of
concern.
A variety of machines were involved, all older than
3 years running some version of Linux or Mac OS X.

OpenSSH clients and servers were all using protocol 2. No
special effort was made to tune the clients and servers, with
the exception that one client was adjusted to prefer a MAC
(Message Authentication Code, used for data integrity protection) based on SHA1 instead of MD5, and in order to
prevent ﬁrewall timeouts disconnecting idle sessions keepalive messages were enabled to some destinations.
Sessions were established between computers over several different types of network connection:
• university computers and researcher’s home (ADSL
512/128);
• university computers and computer of ISP offering
SSH access;
• two university computers, mostly on the same network
subnet;
• two home computers, on the same subnet.
Where possible, trafﬁc was generated with and without
SSH session compression enabled.
The SSH trafﬁc involved with X11 forwarding, NoMachine NX and Samba was restricted to local network activity — we did not have cause to employ these protocols over
a wide-area network such as the Internet.
One challenge in work of this nature is identifying the
nature of the training sample. Is this an interactive session? Or does the data represent a tunneled Web browsing
session? In some areas, such as the identiﬁcation of P2P
connections [17], it is possible to validate a non-payload
based protocol identiﬁcation technique by using an alternative payload-based method. However, this is not an option
in this case.
So a wrapper script, written in Python, was installed
on those machines used to initiate SSH connections. This
wrapper script would log the command and start time of an
SSH session in an SQLite [14] database. On command exit,
an opportunity would be presented to the user to add a short
description of the completed session, which would also be
logged to the database. This information could be used later
in classifying a session into one of several different classes.

5.2

Data Processing

Useful information such as the source and destination
addresses and ports, TCP ﬂags and sequence numbers was
extracted from the headers of captured packets and logged
to an SQLite database. Connections were identiﬁed by
searching for the SYN-ﬂagged packets that identiﬁed the
start of each TCP session, and information on the session,
including its start and end time, and a unique 48-bit identiﬁer based on a hash of the connection start time, source
and destination addresses and ports, would be entered into
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Table 1. Trafﬁc class labels
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Figure 1. Cumulative probability distribution
for class ‘I’, interactive SSH trafﬁc.

Results

We use 10-fold cross-validation to generate confusion
matrices to evaluate the performance of the classiﬁcation.
In the ﬁgures and tables that follow, the different types of
trafﬁc are labeled as described in Table 1.
Figures 1, 2, 3 show sample cumulative probability distributions for trafﬁc through an SSH tunnel representing
interactive, Web browsing and compressed Web browsing
trafﬁc respectively. In each ﬁgure, the graph on the left represents trafﬁc sent by the client to the server, and the graph
on the right represents trafﬁc sent by the server to the client.
Each line represents a cumulative probability (frequency)
distribution of sizes of packets from a single connection,
split into a client half and a server half. At any point, the
graphs reﬂect the proportion of packets from the connection
that were of a particular size or smaller.
As can be seen, these distributions are quite distinct.
However, the same could not be said for all of the distributions.
Tables 2 and 3 show confusion matrices using just the
Bhattacharyya and Jensen-Shannon measures to classify
connections into a particular class. ‘XX’ denotes the unknown class, indicating that no majority verdict could be
reached. Recall that rows are known classes, columns indicate predicted class and the ﬁnal column indicates the number of instances available for classiﬁcation. Matrix entries
are % of total number of connections of each type.

0.9

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

Cumulative Distribution

5.3

1.0

0.9

0.0

Cumulative Distribution

the database. Connections were manually classiﬁed into an
appropriate class using stored information on the command
executed and user-supplied comments. Statistical information was calculated for every classiﬁed connection. All this
information was stored in the SQLite database for later use.
When generating the statistics for each connection, we
use only packets that have arrived in sequence. The sequence can be disturbed by packets reordered in the network, packets retransmitted (and possibly combined with
other packets, rather than the original packet alone being
retransmitted) or packets dropped by the trafﬁc capture program. We implement some simple code to follow the TCP
sequence numbers for each connection.
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Figure 2. Cumulative probability distribution for class ‘H’, Web browsing forwarded
through an SSH tunnel.

F
H
I
IX
N
Q
S

F
93.86
0.00
0.00
0.00
12.50
0.00
14.29

H
0.00
100.00
0.00
1.52
0.00
0.00
0.00

I
0.88
0.00
96.48
6.06
0.00
44.44
28.57

IX
0.00
0.00
0.88
90.91
0.00
11.11
28.57

N
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
37.50
0.00
7.14

Q
0.00
0.00
0.88
0.00
0.00
44.44
0.00

S
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
14.29

XX
5.26
0.00
1.76
1.52
50.00
0.00
7.14

Count
114
49
227
66
8
9
14

Table 2. Confusion Matrix: Bhattacharyya
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Table 3. Confusion Matrix: Jensen-Shannon
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Figure 3. Cumulative probability distribution
for class ‘H’ compressed, Web browsing forwarded through an SSH tunnel where SSH is
performing compression prior to encrypting
the tunneled data.
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Table 5. Confusion Matrix: Jensen-Shannon
+ avg. bytes/sec + threshold=0.015
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Table 4. Confusion Matrix: Bhattacharyya +
avg. bytes/sec + threshold=0.09

As can be seen, both measures do a reasonable job of
separating the four classes with the largest number of connections, but neither does particularly well for the three
classes with only a few connections. We can improve
the class separation by introducing the bytes per second
measure previously described, to add an indication of how
much data was transferred during each session, and a simple threshold on the ﬁnal composite score, to capture the
idea of another distribution needing to be “close enough”
before being considered to be a good match. This is likely
to be especially important when attempting to classify connections involving a protocol for which no training samples
had previously been collected. Table 4 shows the results
of the classiﬁcation for this combination, using a threshold
value of 0.09 (threshold value determined by experiment).
Quite a few connections are now classiﬁed as “unknown”, but class separation is otherwise much improved.
This could be useful in detecting certain types of nonpermitted uses of SSH. For example, 85% of tunneled
HTTP connections were successfully classiﬁed, with no
false positives. So where this type of SSH usage is not per-

I
96.48
5.00

XX
3.52
95.00

Count
227
260

Table 6. Confusion Matrix: Bhattacharyya
mitted by policy, a reasonable level of conﬁdence could be
had in this identiﬁcation. Class separation when using the
Jensen-Shannon method can be improved as well, but not
as substantially as is the case when using the Bhattacharyya
method, as Table 5 indicates.
We now consider how compliance with a policy that
speciﬁes that SSH is to be used in an interactive manner
only might be audited. In this case, interest is not so much
in what particular sort of activity is being conducted, but
in whether the session represents interactive SSH or something else. Table 6 displays the results of using only the
Bhattacharyya measure to classify connections into classes
“interactive” and “everything else”. Classiﬁcations have a
reasonably low level of false positives and false negatives,
which can be improved by including more of the statistical
measures previously described in the classiﬁcation process.
Table 7 displays the results of this classiﬁcation process. It
can be seen that both the false positive and false negative
rates have been improved.

6

Evasion

The distribution of packet sizes from an SSH connection
is an important part of the classiﬁcation performed here. It
would be possible to affect the results by altering this distri-

I
XX

I
97.80
1.92

XX
2.20
98.08

Count
227
260

Table 7. Confusion Matrix: Bhattacharyya
+ maxpacketsize + modepacketsize + avg.
bytes/sec + threshold=0.9
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bution of packet sizes. Simple methods by which this could
be attempted include reducing the MTU of the network interface through which outgoing SSH trafﬁc is sent and compiling a modiﬁed SSH binary which adjusts the TCP maximum segment size using the TCP MAXSEG socket option [29, p. 219]. Changing the MTU reduces the maximum packet size that can be sent over the interface, not
just of SSH trafﬁc but for all trafﬁc and also affects the size
of packets sent in both directions on the connection. The
TCP MAXSEG option affects only the particular connection to which it is applied.
Reducing the size of the largest chunk of data that can
be sent in a single TCP segment will change the packet size
distribution for uses of SSH in which there are many larger
packets (such as ﬁle transfer and HTTP(S) forwarding).
Signiﬁcantly changing the size of the largest packet that
can be sent or received will certainly affect the ability to
classify trafﬁc as representing a particular type of usage.
However, the classiﬁcation of trafﬁc as representing an interactive SSH session or some other type of SSH session
would be less affected: Figure 1 illustrates that both halves
of an interactive SSH connections are principally composed
of small packets. Sessions that have a higher proportion of
larger packets, such as HTTP(S) and ﬁle transfer sessions,
would not easily be confused with interactive SSH, even
when limiting the maximum packet size (by changing the
MTU, for example). The use of additional statistical measures may need to be applied. For example, greater intervention would be required to spread the data transferred out
over a longer period of time in order to preserve the bytes
per second, packets per second and bytes per packet. For
the client to server part of the connection, 92% of interactive sessions in the test data collected satisfy conditions of
average bytes per second less than 300, average packets per
second less than 6 and average bytes per packet less than
70. Only 8% of forwarded Web browsing sessions satisfy
the same requirements. However, a sufﬁciently motivated
and patient adversary with the necessary control over both
the SSH client and server would be able to evade detection.
An adversary that combines several different types of usage in the one SSH session would also be able to frustrate
classiﬁcation of the session as one particular type of trafﬁc,
but without any guarantees of what sort of trafﬁc the session
would be classiﬁed as instead.
Practical deployment of systems that detect anomalies in
the operation of some system or the use of some protocol
can be challenging. It is difﬁcult to collect training data
which is “clean”, that is, which does not contain any attacks. This problem would be familiar to researchers working with some types of intrusion detection systems. In our
case, some generic behaviour proﬁles could be provided. If
local customisation is required to improve detection performance or provide detection for obscure uses, trusted staff

(perhaps including IT staff and others from the wider user
population) who had occasion to work with SSH could be
enlisted to help create clean data that could be used to detect
anomalies.

7

Conclusion

Tunneling one network protocol through another is one
way that attackers or malicious insiders can communicate
through ﬁrewalls or other trafﬁc control and monitoring devices. Furthermore, some network protocols such as SSH
have multiple uses, some of which may be desirable, others which are prohibited by security policies. By monitoring network trafﬁc, it may be possible to determine what
types of activity is taking place, and so provide a simple
audit capability for compliance with security policies. We
describe work to separate SSH connections into different
classes, using some simple statistical calculations and comparisons. We found that using these methods, it is possible
to identify different types of SSH activity with a reasonable
degree of conﬁdence (greater than 74% for the main four
types of activity examined, with very low false positives).
Furthermore, without identifying what kind of trafﬁc it is,
it is possible to identify types of activity other than simple
interactive use of SSH with a high degree of conﬁdence.
We found that it was possible to obtain a reasonable classiﬁcation without attempting to make much use of interarrival times. While we did collect this information, the
manner in which we captured the trafﬁc did not ideally reﬂect the environment in which such captures would be conducted in practice, which would ordinarily be on a gateway machine at some intermediate point between the trafﬁc source and sink. It was considered that this did not adversely affect the packet size data, however.
All sessions were based on the activities of a single user.
We have endeavoured to ensure that a reasonable range of
activities were performed during the monitored sessions so
that there could be some expectation that the results would
be reﬂective of the activities of a wider user population. In
addition to enrolling additional users in a subsequent study,
further work could include use of more sophisticated machine learning methods to improve the classiﬁcation, use
of more statistical measures in classiﬁcation, extension to
other types of tunneled protocols and attempting classiﬁcation based on a sliding window of packets within a session, to identify different uses, some perhaps not conforming with policy, within the one SSH session.
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